SARS exposed, pandemic influenza lurks
Sir-The article by J Peiris and colleagues (April 19, p 1319), 1 identifying a novel coronavirus as a possible cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), signals the start of a long haul in coming to grips with this emerging disease.
While attention is focused on the SARS crisis, and rightly so, sight should not be lost of the fact that the triad of precursor avian influenza viruses (H5N1, H9N2, and H6N1) involved in the genesis of the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus that caused the incipient influenza pandemic in Hong Kong in 1997 persist variously in poultry in southeastern China 2 -the region from which the SARS coronavirus emerged. 1 In 1997, the world was probably one or two mutational events from a pandemic. The continued circulation of multiple genotypes of H5N1 virus, reassorting with other avian influenza viruses, could result in generation of an H5N1 virus with a gene constellation capable of infecting human beings. 3 In February, 2003-at the time of early SARS cases 4 -there was a fatal case of H5N1 infection in Hong Kong, suggesting that some of these reassortant influenza viruses are close to causing a new pandemic; important information for baseline influenza pandemic preparedness. Thus, the spectre of a pandemic caused by H5N1 virus arising in the hypothetical pandemic influenza epicentre of southern China threatens; 5 H9N2 and H6N1 viruses seem to be lower order candidates for pandemicity. 2 Failure to capitalise on these gains could be to global detriment.
A pandemic H5N1 virus (or any other subtype of virus) could be seeded globally in a matter of days, spreading at a faster rate than the SARS coronavirus. The similarity of clinical manifestations of recent H5N1 and SARS fatal pneumonia cases (Y Guan, personal communication) could pose problems in differential diagnosis beyond Hong Kong. Health authorities worldwide need to have in place plans to differentiate infection by agent. Rapid, reliable, inexpensive diagnostic reagents need to be developed quickly.
H5N1 virus infection has proven fatal for chicken (and sometimes other poultry) as well as for human beings. With poultry now the major source of meat protein worldwide, this fact has implications for food supply and international trade. It also raises the possibility that human beings and chickens can be cross-infected in the absence of tight biosecurity, the virus potentially spreading in chickens in pandemic mode. 2 Veterinary regulatory authorities need to be aware of the human-avian dimension of H5N1. Furthermore, they and their public-health colleagues might have to consider additional control strategies should the SARS coronavirus be shown to have an animal connection. the British biomedical research scene as a whole? Perhaps reflecting the composition of the government committee and the limited range of opinion that the report canvassed, it does not provide any genuine insight into the successes of the MRC, particularly its ability to provide long-term support for particularly talented scientists. To fail to provide any examples of this unique aspect of its work or to analyse the outcome of its training programmes for young scientists is an incomprehensible omission for a report on the work of a body that supports medical research.
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Similarly, the report does not examine the work of the MRC against the broader background of the extraordinary changes in the biomedical sciences of recent years, and the pressures that they are posing for every funding body. The hyperbole generated by the genomics era with all its uncertainties about its potential for medical research and care and how they should best be realised, the widely accepted perception that only large groups with appropriate plant and equipment can hope to be internationally competitive, government pressures on funding bodies to provide work that will be commercially viable in the short term, and the constantly shifting scene of the future of research in universities and the National Health Service (NHS)-which is so closely interlocked with the work of the MRC-combine to make it increasingly difficult for the council to know how best to use its limited resources, let alone how to balance the increasing demands of the basic and clinical sciences.
The report also sends confusing messages to the MRC about its role in funding medical research. As a body that has given strong support to the basic biomedical sciences, particularly molecular and cell biology, and has been heavily criticised by the clinical fraternity for choosing this path, it will undoubtedly be surprised to be told that it is focusing too much on the immediate requirements of the NHS with the danger that it might neglect its longer term goals.
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A fair hearing for the Medical Research Council
Sir-Your April 5 Editorial (p 1143), 1 in painting an accurate picture of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee's report, 2 emphasises some of its shortcomings. The report's 41 conclusions (40 since the same one appears twice) consist of a string of criticisms about management and communication, interspersed with an occasional damning word of faint praise. But is it fair on the MRC, and is it helpful to
